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Abstract
The authors analyze the welfare implications of simple monetary policy rules in the context of an
estimated model of a small open economy for Canada with traded and non-traded goods, and with
sticky prices and wages. They ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant heterogeneity in the degree of price
rigidity across sectors. They also ﬁnd welfare gains in targeting only the non-traded-goods
inﬂation, since prices are found to be more sticky in this production sector, but those gains come
at the cost of substantially increased aggregate volatility.
The authors look for the welfare-maximizing speciﬁcation of an interest rate reaction function
that allows for a speciﬁc price-level target. They ﬁnd, however, that, overall, the higher welfare is
achieved, given the estimated model for the Canadian economy, with a strict inﬂation-targeting
rule where the central bank reacts to the next period’s expected deviation from the inﬂation target
and does not target the output gap.
JEL classiﬁcation: E31, E32, E52
Bank classiﬁcation: Economic models; Exchange rates; Inﬂation targets
Résumé
Les auteurs analysent les implications pour le bien-être de règles simples de politique monétaire,
en estimant un modèle de petite économie ouverte pour le Canada qui compte deux secteurs
(biens échangeables et non échangeables) et où les prix et les salaires sont rigides. Ils observent
que le degré de rigidité des prix diffère de façon statistiquement signiﬁcative entre les deux
secteurs. Ils constatent également que la poursuite d’une cible fondée exclusivement sur
l’inﬂation des prix des biens non échangeables permet un gain de bien-être, car les prix de ces
biens sont plus rigides que ceux des biens échangeables. Ce gain est toutefois obtenu au prix
d’une augmentation substantielle de la volatilité globale.
Les auteurs cherchent à établir s’il existe une spéciﬁcation de la fonction de réaction aux taux
d’intérêt qui admet une cible précise pour le niveau des prix et qui permet de maximiser le bien-
être. Ils remarquent cependant que le bien-être s’accroît davantage, dans le modèle estimé de
l’économie canadienne, lorsque la banque centrale prend strictement pour cible l’inﬂation et
qu’elle réagit aux écarts qu’elle s’attend à observer par rapport à la cible au cours de la période
suivante, sans tenir compte de l’écart de production.
Classiﬁcation JEL : E31, E32, E52
Classification de la Banque : Modèles économiques; Taux de change; Cibles en matière d’inflation1 Introduction
This paper analyzes the welfare implications of simple monetary policy reaction functions in the context
of a New Keynesian, small open economy model with a traded-goods and a non-traded-goods sector and
with imperfect competition and staggered prices in the product and labour markets, estimated for the case
of Canada. The model belongs to the class of dynamic stochastic general-equilibrium models with explicit
microfoundations that constitute the so-called New Open Economy Macroeconomics (NOEM), pioneered
by Obstfeld and Rogo® (1995), that has become a substantial literature, the results of which are partly
summarized in Lane (2001), among others. Several such models have been estimated for Canada (for
example, Ambler, Dib, and Rebei 2003 and Bergin 2003), none of which is in a multisectoral setting.
In this paper, we have two main objectives. First, we want to characterize the simple, Taylor-type
monetary policy reaction function that would deliver higher welfare, given the estimated model. Throughout
the paper, we consider simple reaction functions only. We do not compute the optimal monetary policy; i.e.,
we do not solve for the instrument value needed to bring in°ation to target at each period, given all models'
responses to realized shocks, but rather derive the proportional reaction of interest rates to deviations of
in°ation from target, and to the other arguments in the speci¯ed Taylor-type rule. We therefore compare the
welfare gain of the welfare-maximizing standard Taylor rule with alternative speci¯cations of the nominal
interest rate feedback rule that allow for di®erent coe±cients on wage in°ation as well as on price in°ation
in the traded-goods and non-traded-goods sectors, since the preferences of households may favour one sector
over another.
Second, we evaluate the welfare gain or loss of using a monetary policy rule that reacts to deviations
from the target of the price level. If willing to acknowledge that households would like to reduce uncertainty
regarding the long-run purchasing power of money, a monetary authority that optimizes social welfare may
want to target the price level on top of, or instead of, the in°ation-rate level. However, many issues arise
when a price-level target is introduced, such as the implications for the volatility of the main macro variables,
not the least of which is in°ation itself (see, for example, Bank of Canada 1998). With an in°ation target,
the initial increase in the price level after a shock that pushes in°ation above its target would not be reversed,
so there would be a permanent rise in the price level. In contrast, with a price-level target, a shock that
pushed the price level above its target path would initially cause in°ation to rise above its long-run average,
but as the central bank took action to return the price level to its target path, the in°ation rate would have
to decline below its long-run average for some time to unwind the e®ect of the initial positive shock on the
price level.
To the best of our knowledge, neither of these two issues|i.e., characterizing the welfare-maximizing
simple in°ation-targeting rule and evaluating the welfare gain of alternative speci¯cations of the monetary
policy reaction function, including price-level targeting|has been explored in the context of a multisector,
small open economy NOEM model.1
The model economy aims at representing the main features needed for conducting monetary policy
1Papers by Kollmann (2002) and Smets and Wouters (2002) are recent examples of where the welfare implications of monetary
policy are investigated for small open economy NOEM models.
1analysis in a tractable characterization of the Canadian economy. The main features of our model economy
are that (i) there is monopolistic competition and staggered prices in the labour market, as well as in
all product markets (domestic non-traded goods, domestic traded goods|for domestic consumption or for
exports|and imports); the degree of price rigidity can di®er across sectors and with respect to wages; (ii)
labour and capital are mobile across sectors and each sector has its own technology process; (iii) traded
goods are priced to market; and (iv) the systematic behaviour of the monetary policy is represented by
the standard Taylor rule, where nominal interest rates respond to deviations of overall in°ation from target
and to the output gap. The economy is subject to eight shocks: three common domestic shocks (monetary
policy shocks, shocks to the money demand, and shocks to the risk premium), two sector-speci¯c technology
shocks (to the non-traded-goods sector and to the domestic traded-goods sector), and three foreign shocks
(output, in°ation, and nominal interest rate). The model is estimated using Bayesian techniques for quarterly
Canadian data. Our estimates seem reasonable and are compatible with other small open economy estimated
models in the NOEM literature for the Canadian case. We ¯nd statistically signi¯cant heterogeneity in the
degree of nominal rigidity across sectoral prices, but wages are the stickiest prices of all.
We evaluate the welfare gains of alternative speci¯cations of a simple in°ation-targeting rule using a
second-order approximation of the expected permanent utility in each case compared with that of the esti-
mated rule. We also compare monetary policy rules according to their implications in terms of aggregate
°uctuations. In particular, we compute the unconditional volatility they imply for the utility and its argu-
ments, as well as the unconditional volatility they imply for some crucial macro variables, such as output,
in°ation, and the nominal interest rate. We also compute the long-run variance decomposition under each
monetary policy rule, the impulse responses to di®erent shocks, and the prediction for the time series of the
in°ation deviations with respect to target, in order to gauge the amount of time in which in°ation would be
out of a certain range, given the monetary policy reaction function and the type of shock.
We ¯nd that there would have been some welfare improvement with respect to the estimated rule for
the past three decades in Canada had the central bank been a slightly more aggressive in°ation targeter,
i.e., with no reaction to the output gap. Despite the fact that the nominal wage is the stickier price, we
¯nd welfare losses if the central bank were to target wage in°ation rather than consumer price index (CPI)
in°ation. Impulse-response functions show that pure CPI in°ation targeting brings the main macroeconomic
variables (particularly aggregate demand) closer to their reaction in the case of °exible prices and wages than
targeting wage in°ation. However, a substantial welfare gain is made from targeting sectoral rather than
aggregate in°ation, particularly from targeting only in°ation deviations from target in the stickier sector,
i.e., non-traded goods. But this higher welfare comes at the expense of higher volatility in the main macro
variables, including in°ation and output (while in°ation in the non-traded-goods sector is stabilized), than
when targeting aggregate in°ation.
Finally, we compute the welfare implications of moving away from strict in°ation targeting to pure price-
level targeting. We ¯nd that there is no noticeable welfare gain in doing so. A hybrid rule is preferable to
strict in°ation targeting only when the reaction to price and in°ation deviations from target is very low,
i.e., when monetary policy is not aggressive and therefore takes far longer to bring about price and in°ation
stabilization, but the welfare gain is still virtually unnoticeable and comes from the lower volatility induced
2by the mild reaction of the monetary policy. When exploring the welfare implications of price-level or hybrid
rules for sectoral prices, it is always preferable to target only the non-traded-goods sector, as was the case
under strict in°ation targeting.
Still, strict in°ation targeting with moderate nominal interest rate smoothing and no output-gap targeting
is the simple rule that delivers higher welfare, particularly when the central bank reacts to expected future
deviations from target in°ation instead of to contemporaneous in°ation deviations.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the model. In section
3, we describe the estimation method and discuss the parameter estimates. We outline the more relevant
quantitative implications of the model in section 4. In section 5, we discuss the optimized parameterization
for the monetary policy rule under alternative speci¯cations of in°ation-targeting Taylor-type rules. In
section 6, we analyze the e®ect of the size of the non-traded-goods sector on the choice of the in°ation rate
to target. In section 7, we explore the welfare implications of considering price-level and hybrid targeting




The ith household chooses consumption ct(i), investment it(i), money balances Mt(i), hours worked ht(i),
local riskless bonds Bdt(i), and foreign bonds Bd¤
t(i) that maximize its expected utility function, and it sets
the wage rate constrained to a Calvo-type nominal rigidity in wages.












where ¯ 2 (0;1), E0 is the conditional expectations operator, Mt denotes nominal money balances held at
the end of the period, and Pt is a price index that can be interpreted as the CPI. The functional form of


















+ ´ log(1 ¡ ht(i)); (2)
where ° and ´ are positive parameters. Total time available to the household in the period is normalized to
one. The bt term is a shock to money demand. It follows the ¯rst-order autoregressive process given by
log(bt) = (1 ¡ ½b)log(b) + ½b log(bt¡1) + "bt; (3)
with 0 < ½b < 1 and where the serially uncorrelated shock "bt is normally distributed with zero mean and
3standard deviation ¾b. The household's budget constraint is given by










tkt(i) + Mt¡1(i) + Bdt¡1(i) + etBd¤








kt(i) is the cost faced each time the household adjusts its stock of capital
kt(i), it(i) is the investment, Wt(i) is the nominal wage rate, Rk
t is the nominal interest on rented capital,
Bd¤
t(i) and Bdt(i) are foreign-currency and domestic-currency bonds purchased in t, and et is the nominal
exchange rate. Domestic-currency bonds are used by the government to ¯nance its de¯cit. Rt and R¤
t denote,
respectively, the gross nominal domestic and foreign interest rates between t and t + 1. The household also




from domestic producers of traded and non-traded goods and from importers of intermediate goods.
We assume that each household i sells in a monopolistically competitive market their labour supply, ht(i),











where #h > 1 is de¯ned as the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) between di®erentiated labour skills.


















Households face a nominal rigidity coming from a Calvo-type contract on wages. When allowed to do so,
with probability (1¡dh) each period, the household chooses the nominal-wage contract, ~ Wt(i), to maximize
its utility.2
·t is a risk premium that re°ects departures from uncovered interest rate parity. It depends on the ratio












2There will thus be a distribution of wages Wt(i) across households at any given time t. We follow Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Evans (2001, 2005) and assume that there exists a state-contingent security that insures the households against variations in
households' speci¯c labour income. As a result, the labour component of households' income will be equal to aggregate labour
income, and the marginal utility of wealth will be identical across di®erent types of households. This allows us to suppose





t(i)di. By following this functional form, the risk premium ensures that the model has a
unique steady state.3 We allow for an exogenous shock on the risk premium whose law of motion is
log($·t) = ½· log($·t¡1) + "·t; (9)
with serially uncorrelated disturbance "·t normally distributed with zero mean and standard deviation ¾·,
and with 0 < ½· < 1.
The foreign nominal interest rate, R¤
t, is exogenous and evolves according to the following stochastic
process:
log(R¤
t) = (1 ¡ ½R¤)log(R¤) + ½R¤ log(R¤
t¡1) + "R¤t; (10)
with 0 < ½R¤ < 1 and where the serially uncorrelated shock, "R¤t, is normally distributed with zero mean
and standard deviation ¾R¤.










































































































where lower-case letters are the real counterparts of the nominal variables explained before, except for st,
which stands for the real exchange rate. ~ wt is the real wage contract.
3If domestic and foreign interest rates are equal, the time paths of domestic consumption and wealth follow random walks.
For an early discussion of this problem, see Giavazzi and Wyplosz (1984). Our risk-premium equation is similar to the one
used by Senhadji (1997). For alternative ways of ensuring that stationary paths exist for consumption in small open economy
models, see Schmitt-Groh¶ e and Uribe (2003).
52.2 Firms
Monopolistically competitive ¯rms produce traded and non-traded goods. The traded goods are either
imported or produced domestically, which in turn can either be sold at home or exported.
2.2.1 Non-traded-goods sector
A continuum of ¯rms is indexed by j 2 [0;1] in the non-traded-goods sector. There is monopolistic competi-
tion in the market for non-traded goods, which are imperfect substitutes for each other in the production of
the composite good yN
t , produced by a representative competitive ¯rm. Aggregate non-traded-goods output












where #N is the elasticity of substitution between di®erentiated non-traded goods. Given the aggregate
and individual prices PN
t and PN
t (j), respectively, the non-traded ¯nal-good-producing ¯rm chooses the
production, yN
t , that maximizes its pro¯ts. The ¯rst-order condition corresponds to the demand constraint
























Each monopolistically competitive ¯rm has a production function given by
yN













t is the non-traded-goods sector-speci¯c total-factor productivity that follows the stochastic process
log(AN
t ) = (1 ¡ ½AN)log(AN) + ½AN log(AN
t¡1) + "ANt (20)
with "ANt a non-serially correlated technology shock normally distributed with zero mean and standard
deviation ¾AN.
Firms face a nominal rigidity coming from a Calvo-type contract on prices. When allowed to do so, with
probability (1 ¡ dN) each period, the producer of non-traded good j sets the price ~ PN
t (j) to maximize its
weighted expected pro¯ts. Therefore, each ¯rm chooses kN
t (j), hN
t (j), and ~ PN





















where ¸t is the marginal utility of wealth for a representative household, and time t + l pro¯ts of the ¯rm
changing price at time t are
DN






6The ¯rst-order conditions are
Wt
Pt







































where »t(i) is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the production function constraint. It measures the
real marginal cost of the ¯rm in the non-traded-goods sector.
2.2.2 Traded-goods sector
Domestic ¯rms producing goods in the traded sector have to solve a similar problem, except that each
monopolistically competitive ¯rm k produces two types of goods: yTd
t (k), which will be consumed in the
domestic market, and yX
t (k), which will be exported, for k 2 [0;1].
The production function is as follows:
yT













t is the traded-goods sector-speci¯c total-factor productivity
log(AT
t ) = (1 ¡ ½AT)log(AT) + ½AT log(AT
t¡1) + "ATt (25)
and "ATt is the serially uncorrelated shock, which is normally distributed with zero mean and standard
deviation ¾AT.
Each ¯rm chooses kT
t (k), hT
t (k), PTd
t (k), and PX
t (k). We assume complete pricing to market for exports;
i.e., PX
t (k) is labelled in U.S. dollars.4 In addition, once the ¯rm has the chance to update its price (with
probability (1¡dT) each period) it will choose simultaneously ~ PTd
t (k) and ~ PX
t (k). The problem of each ¯rm




t (k); ~ P Td

















where time t + l pro¯ts of the ¯rm changing price at time t are
DT
t+l(k) ´ ~ PTd
t (k)yTd






4There is substantial evidence in favour of the pricing-to-market hypothesis in the Canada-U.S. case. Engel and Rogers
(1996) use CPI data for U.S. and Canadian cities and ¯nd that deviations from the law of one price are much higher for two
cities located in di®erent countries than for two equidistant cities in the same country. Also, there is evidence suggesting the
prevalence of invoicing in U.S. dollars by foreign ¯rms selling in the U.S. market. Indeed, acccording to the ECU Institute
(1995), over 80 per cent of U.S. imports were invoiced in U.S. dollars.
























where #T is the elasticity of substitution between di®erentiated traded goods.
The ¯rst-order conditions are
Wt
Pt
































































where ³t+l(k) is the real marginal cost of the ¯rm in the traded-goods sector.






























t is total production in the traded-goods sector, and yTd
t and yX
t are traded goods, respectively, for
domestic and foreign markets.




































¹ captures the elasticity of substitution between the exported goods and foreign-produced goods in
the consumption basket of foreign consumers, and y¤
t and P¤
t are, respectively, foreign output and the price
index. Both variables are exogenously given, and foreign output and in°ation follow the stochastic processes
log(y¤
t) = (1 ¡ ½y¤)log(y¤) + ½y¤ log(y¤
t¡1) + "y¤t
log(¼¤
t) = (1 ¡ ½¼¤)log(¼¤) + ½¼¤ log(¼¤
t¡1) + "¼¤t; (38)
with 0 < ½y¤;½¼¤ < 1 and where the serially uncorrelated shocks, "y¤t and "¼¤t, are normally distributed
with zero mean and standard deviation ¾y¤ and ¾¼¤, respectively.
2.2.3 Imported-goods sector
Finally, there is a continuum of intermediate-goods-importing ¯rms indexed by i 2 [0;1]. Monopolistic
competition takes place in the market for imported intermediate goods, which are imperfect substitutes for
each other in the production of the composite imported good, yM
t , produced by a representative competitive
¯rm. We also assume Calvo-type staggered price setting in the imported-goods sector to capture the empirical
evidence on incomplete exchange rate pass-through into import prices.5 Thus, when allowed to do so (with
probability (1 ¡ dM) each period), the importer of good i sets the price, ~ PM
t (i), to maximize its weighted
expected pro¯ts. It solves
max


































with #M representing the elasticity of substitution across di®erentiated imported goods. Note that the
marginal cost of the importing ¯rm is etP¤
t































5Campa and Goldberg (2002) ¯nd that they can reject the hypothesis of complete short-run pass-through in 22 of the
25 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries of their study for the period 1975{99, but
they ¯nd complete long-run pass-through. Ghosh and Wolf (2001) argue that sticky prices or menu costs are a preferable
explanation for imperfect pass-through since they are compatible with complete long-run pass-through, while that is not the
case for explanations based on international product di®erentiation. The evidence of incomplete exchange rate pass-through in
Canada is well documented and seems to conclude that zero pass-through has almost been reached in the recent past. See, for
example, Bailliu and Bouakez (2004), Kichian (2001), and Leung (2003).
6For convenience, we assume that the price in foreign currency of all imported intermediate goods is P¤
t , which is also equal
to the foreign price level.

























The ¯nal domestically consumed good, yd
t , is produced by a competitive ¯rm that uses non-traded goods,
yN


















where n > 0 is the share of non-traded goods in the domestic goods basket at the steady state, and Á > 0























Furthermore, the domestic ¯nal-good price, Pd





t )1¡Á + (1 ¡ n)(PTd
t )1¡Á¤1=(1¡Á)
: (45)

















where m > 0 is the share of domestic goods in the ¯nal-goods basket at the steady state, and º > 0 is the






















t )1¡º + (1 ¡ m)(PM
t )1¡º¤1=(1¡º)
: (49)
10Aggregate output is used for consumption, investment, and for covering the cost of adjusting capital
zt = ct + it(1 + CACt): (50)
The gross domestic product is yt = zt + yX
t ¡ yM
t . Finally, sectoral hours and capital simply sum to the
aggregate hours and capital o®ered by households, i.e., hN
t + hT




The government budget constraint is given by














We consider a simple decision rule for the nominal interest rate, such as the standard Taylor rule,
log(Rt=R) = ½R log(Rt¡1=R) + ½¼ log(¼t=¼) + ½y log(yt=y) + "Rt; (52)
where R, ¼, and y are the steady-state values of the gross nominal interest rate, CPI in°ation, and real gross
domestic output, and where "Rt is a zero-mean, serially uncorrelated monetary policy shock with standard
deviation ¾R.
3 Estimation
The above model is estimated using Bayesian estimation techniques that update prior distributions for the
deep parameters of the model, which are de¯ned according to a reasonable calibration, using the actual data.
The estimation is done using recursive simulation methods, particularly the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm,
which has been applied to estimate similar dynamic stochastic general-equilibrium models in the literature,
such as Smets and Wouters (2003).
The model has eight shock processes: three common domestic shocks|to the monetary policy, "Rt, to the
money demand, "bt, and to the risk premium, "·t; two sector-speci¯c technology shocks|to the non-traded
sector, "ANt, and to the traded one, "ATdt; and three foreign shocks|to the foreign output, "y¤t, to the
foreign in°ation, "¼¤t, and to the foreign nominal interest rate, "R¤t. To identify them in the estimation
process, we need to use the same number of actual series. We choose them to be as informative as possible.
We use HP-¯ltered and seasonally adjusted quarterly series for Canada for the period 1972Q1{2003Q4. The
series are real exchange rate (against the U.S. dollar), real output, nominal interest rate on three-month
T-bills, real M2 per capita (de°ated with the CPI), CPI in°ation, U.S. real output per capita, U.S. CPI
in°ation, and nominal U.S. interest rate on three-month T-bills.
Table 1 shows the prior distributions we have imposed for the deep parameters of the model, as well as
the median and 90 per cent con¯dence interval for the posterior distributions. Figures 1 and 2 convey the
11same information by drawing the prior distributions, in thick lines, together with the posterior ones, in thin
lines.
We have borrowed some of the prior distributions from the literature, but for those for which we had no
references, we used common sense, while trying to construct small restrictive priors. We selected beta distri-
butions for those coe±cients that we wanted to restrict to lie between 0 and 1, such as the autocorrelation
coe±cients of the shock processes or the share parameters. Gamma and Inverted Gamma distributions are
imposed, when required, to guarantee real positive values.
All three sectors|domestic traded goods, imports, and non-traded goods|are treated symmetrically a
priori. They are given the same degree of nominal rigidity, in the form of an average prior probability of not
changing prices of 0.67, which corresponds to changing prices every three quarters on average. The priors
for the elasticities of substitution between di®erentiated goods are also equal across sectors, corresponding
to equal steady-state markups across sectors.
Some parameter values are taken as ¯xed rather than given a prior distribution that will be updated
with the data; we calibrate them to values similar to those found in the literature. We performed sensitivity
analysis on their calibrated values and observed that the estimates of the remaining model parameters were
unchanged. These parameters are: the subjective discount rate, ¯ = 0:99, which implies an annual real
interest rate of 4 per cent; the weight of leisure in the utility function, ´, which is calibrated to yield a
steady-state share of time devoted to market activities of 30 per cent; the quarterly depreciation rate of
capital, ± = 0:025; the gross steady-state markups in all sectors, #
#¡1 = 1:14, which lie between the estimates
of the empirical literature (see, for example, Basu 1995); and the preference parameter governing the elasticity
of substitution between consumption and real balances, ° = 0:1, for which we have taken a value that lies
between values estimated for Canada by Dib (2003), ° = 0:03, and Ambler, Dib, and Rebei (2004), ° = 0:2.
We ¯nd that data are most informative for the adequate parameterization of the price stickiness, the
monetary policy reaction function, and the shocks processes.
The prior of equal nominal rigidity across sectors does not hold, which is consistent with the ¯ndings of
Bils and Klenow (2004), who document a high degree of heterogeneity in the frequency of price changes across
retail goods and services. Indeed, we ¯nd signi¯cant heterogeneity in the degree of price stickiness across
sectors; import prices are the more °exible (with posterior median duration for prices of two quarters), and
non-traded-goods prices are more sticky (posterior median of almost three quarters). The prices of domestic
traded goods are estimated to have a posterior median duration of two and one-half quarters.7 Table 1 shows
that the 90 per cent posterior con¯dence interval for dM does not even overlap with those for dN and dT:
Similarly, Figure 2 shows how the equal prior distribution barely overlaps with the posterior distributions for
dM: However, and consistent with virtually any study that examines wage and price rigidities, the highest
nominal stickiness of all is found for wages, with an estimated posterior duration of ¯ve quarters. In fact, one
7Our sectoral estimates bridge the gap between the usual estimates of around four quarters for the aggregate price level and
the microeconomic evidence of average duration of prices at the individual ¯rm level of around one quarter. In a back-of-the-
envelope calculation, if we weight the sectoral posterior median durations by the posterior median estimates of the steady-state
weights of the sectoral outputs in ¯nal consumption, we obtain an overall economy duration of prices of two and one-third
quarters, i.e., seven months. Those estimated weights in the ¯nal consumption basket are 0.29 for non-tradable goods, 0.25 for
tradable goods produced domestically, and 0.46 for imports.
12of the possible reasons behind the higher stickiness of prices for non-traded goods versus prices for traded
goods can be the higher weight of wages in the cost of production of non-traded goods.
This heterogeneity in the nominal rigidity is an important ¯nding and will condition many of the model
implications for the dynamics as well as for the welfare improvement of alternative speci¯cations of the
monetary policy reaction function. This is especially so when the central bank is willing to weight di®erently
in°ation stabilization in di®erent sectors, owing to the consideration that agents may derive more utility
from consumption from one particular sector than from another.
The posterior estimates of the Taylor rule almost halve the prior degree of interest rate smoothing
(posterior median ½R = 0:46), somewhat reduce the reaction to deviations of in°ation from target to ½¼ =
1:19, and ¯nd a signi¯cant but low reaction to the output gap, with a posterior median coe±cient ½y = 0:3.
The historical estimated Taylor rule, therefore, is an in°ation-targeting one with moderate concern for output
stabilization and with some sluggishness in the monetary policy instrument.
The actual data are also found to be very informative for estimating the volatility of shocks, which were
given equal priors. Posterior estimates indicate that aggregate demand shocks, represented by the money
demand, are the more volatile|although the variance decomposition in the next section shows that they play
a very small role in explaining aggregate °uctuations in this model|followed by shocks to the non-traded
technology.
Data, however, found little informative for a number of parameters whose posterior distributions are
coincident with their priors. Particularly, this is the case for the parameter governing risk-premium dynamics,
', or those governing the steady-state shares of traded and non-traded goods in the domestic ¯nal composite
good and those of domestic and imported content of the ¯nal consumption good, n and m, respectively.
4 Quantitative Implications of the Model
This section discusses the dynamics of the estimated model in terms of the variance decomposition of its
main endogenous variables and in terms of their impulse responses to the shocks contemplated in the model.
We discuss only the responses to the three shocks that are found to be more important in explaining the
variability of consumption (the main determinant of utility and, hence, welfare), in°ation, and output.
These responses are the technology shock in the non-traded-goods sector, the monetary policy shock, and
the foreign monetary policy shock.
4.1 Variance decomposition
Table 2 shows the decomposition of the long-run variance of the main endogenous variables of the model
into the contribution of each of the eight shocks.
The business cycle volatility of the output in each production sector, traded and non-traded, is explained
mainly by its corresponding sector-speci¯c technology shock, but there is a substantial role for the monetary
policy shocks as well, the domestic policy shocks on domestic traded production, and foreign shocks on
exports and imports. Aggregate in°ation is found to be better explained by technology shocks (through
their impact on the non-traded in°ation) and by foreign interest rate and risk-premium shocks (through
13the impact of both on imports in°ation) than by monetary policy shocks in the past three decades. Final
spending, i.e., consumption and investment, are explained mainly by the non-traded-goods technology shock,
which is one of the shocks with higher estimated volatility, although the steady-state share of the non-traded-
goods sector in the ¯nal good is only one-third. Hours worked are substantially explained by technology
shocks in the two sectors, but are also clearly a®ected by monetary policy shocks. Finally, the volatility of
the real exchange rate is explained by shocks to technology, foreign monetary policy, and the risk premium.
4.2 Responses to a foreign shock
Figure 3 represents the responses in terms of percentage deviations with respect to the steady state to a
one-period increase of 100 basis points in the monetary policy instrument of the foreign economy, the United
States.
The uncovered interest rate parity yields a nominal and real impact depreciation of the Canadian dollar
(2 per cent posterior median depreciation on impact of the real exchange rate, st). The real depreciation
causes a direct rise in the marginal cost of the importing ¯rms and is therefore translated into higher import
prices and fewer imports, yM
t . It is important to note, however, that as result of the estimated sluggishness
of import prices, the exchange rate pass-through is not complete, and imports in°ation rises by only 50 basis
points.
Exports bene¯t from the depreciation. Because exports are priced in the foreign currency but traded-
sector ¯rms maximize their pro¯ts in Canadian dollars, the depreciation by itself increases the bene¯ts from
the part of the production that is exported. As a result, producers in the traded-goods sector lower export
prices and increase their exports on impact.
The increase of imports in°ation makes aggregate in°ation rise, which causes a monetary policy contrac-
tion. That, in turn, decreases demand (ct and it) that further reduces imports demand but also decreases
demand of non-traded and of traded goods produced domestically. The monetary policy contraction also
helps undo the initial depreciation.
4.3 Responses to a sectoral shock
Figure 4 represents the responses to a positive one-period technology shock of 1 per cent in the non-traded-
goods sector only.
Increased production in the non-traded-goods sector8 raises demand throughout the economy and there-
fore increases output in the traded and imports sectors, as well.
Prices in the non-traded-goods sector fall on impact, leading to a mild fall in overall in°ation, which in
turn causes an expansionary reaction of the monetary policy that feeds into a further increase of demand
and causes a nominal and real depreciation on impact.
8As is well known in the literature, sticky prices prevent the 1 per cent increase in total-factor productivity from being fully
transformed into a 1 per cent increase in yNT
t . Since capital is predetermined, the only way to generate that lower output
increase is by reducing hours worked on impact, which is observed in Figure 4. hNT
t falls on impact but increases after four
quarters.
14Growth in demand increases imports as well as imports in°ation, which helps to qiuckly undo the fall in
aggregate in°ation.
As before, the depreciation increases the pro¯ts of the exported production in the traded sector, but
demand in exports does not rise (foreign output being exogenous). Thus, maximization of the pro¯t in the
traded-goods sector makes ¯rms lower export prices ¯xed in U.S. dollars (pricing to market) and increase
exports.
4.4 Responses to a common domestic shock
Figure 5 represents the responses to a temporary monetary policy contraction. The nominal interest rate
shock increases by 100 basis points for one period. On impact, the monetary policy instrument rises by less
than 1 per cent because of the immediate drop in in°ation and because of signi¯cant interest rate smoothing.
In fact, nominal interest rates rise by only one-half of the 1 per cent shock. In°ation falls on impact because
of the impact decrease in demand and consequently in activity in every sector|traded goods, non-traded
goods, and imports.
The monetary policy contraction causes a nominal and real impact appreciation of the Canadian dollar.
Since export prices are being set in U.S. dollars, the appreciation reduces exporters' pro¯ts, and export
prices consequently rise, which causes a drop in exports.
5 Simple In°ation-Targeting Rules
In this section, we search for the parameterization of feedback Taylor-type interest rate rules, similar to
equation (52), that maximize household welfare given our estimated model. We evaluate the welfare gain
they represent with respect to the estimated monetary policy reaction function (or \historical rule" in the
tables), as well as their implications in terms of aggregate °uctuations.
The welfare implications are displayed in Table 3. Table 4 reports another dimension for comparing
alternative monetary policy reaction functions: the unconditional volatility they imply for the utility and
its arguments as well as for a number of crucial macro variables, i.e., output, in°ation, and the nominal
interest rate. We also compute the following business cycle implications for each di®erent monetary policy
rule discussed: the long-run variance decomposition (Tables 5, 6, and 7), the impulse responses to di®erent
shocks (Figures 6, 7, and 8), and the prediction for the time series of the in°ation deviations with respect to
target|to gauge the proportion of time in°ation would be out of a certain range given the monetary policy
reaction function and the type of shock (Figures 9 and 18 to 25).
The search for the welfare-maximizing feedback monetary policy rules is set out as follows. We maximize
the unconditional expectation of lifetime utility9 of households over the parameters of the Taylor rule. This
9Schmitt-Groh¶ e and Uribe (2004b) adopt the conditional welfare optimization in their framework and they consider the
non-stochastic steady state as an initial state of the economy. By computing the unconditional long-run utility, we do not
consider the e®ect of the initial state. Transition costs are crucially dependent on that initial state, especially if the real state
of the economy is never at the deterministic level. In addition, Schmitt-Groh¶ e and Uribe (2004b) show that the optimal rule is
robust to these de¯nitions of welfare, but that the welfare improvement could be di®erent in the sense that it is higher in the





We measure the welfare gain associated with a particular monetary policy in terms of its compensating
variation. That is, we calculate the percentage of lifetime consumption that should be added to that obtained
under the estimated Taylor rule in order to give households the same unconditional expected utility as under
the new monetary policy rule scenario:
E fu(ct(1 + welfare gain);mt;ht)g = E
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o
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where variables without tildes are obtained under the estimated rule described before, and variables with
tildes are under the optimized Taylor rule. Based on the results found in Kim and Kim (2003) and subsequent
literature, we compute the long-run average utility by means of a second-order approximation around the
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t and u00 are the ¯rst and second derivatives, respectively, of the utility function with respect to its
arguments, evaluated at their deterministic steady-state values, and variables with hats measure deviations
from their levels in the deterministic steady state. The compensating variation in consumption can therefore
be decomposed into a ¯rst-level e®ect and a second-level or stabilization e®ect, i.e., into the welfare gains of
the new parameterization of the monetary policy owing to its e®ect on the average levels of consumption,
real balances, and leisure and its e®ect on their volatilities. The ¯rst-level e®ect is de¯ned as:
E fu(ct(1 + 1st-level e®ect);mt;ht)g = u(c;m;h) + u0E
³
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and the second-level e®ect as:
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The overall e®ect in all cases is such that, approximately, (1 + welfare gain) ¼ (1 + 1st-level e®ect)(1 +
2nd-level e®ect). Table 3 reports the welfare gains, together with the unconditional long-run average values
of the arguments of the utility function, as well as that of the log utility itself.
In what follows, we limit our attention to the Taylor-type rules that guarantee the existence of a unique
and stable equilibrium in the neighbourhood of the deterministic steady state. We also restrict our search
16to monetary policy reactions to price and output deviations from target; we do this by keeping the degree
of nominal interest smoothing unchanged and equal to the posterior median of the estimated value, i.e.,
½R = 0:46.10
Our reference interest rate feedback rule is the estimated one where, on top of that moderate nominal
interest rate smoothing, the monetary authority has targeted in°ation but not very aggressively (the posterior
median estimate for the reaction to deviations of the aggregate CPI in°ation from target is slightly above
1, ½¼ = 1:19) and there has been a signi¯cant although weak response of the monetary policy to the output
gap (posterior median of ½y = 0:31).
5.1 CPI in°ation rate targeting
First, we consider the case where the central bank targets the same variables as in the historical rule, i.e.,
aggregate CPI in°ation and the output gap. The welfare-maximizing Taylor rule implies a very similar level
of aggressiveness with respect to in°ation deviations from target to that of the estimated historical rule,
½¼ = 1:20, but, contrary to the historical case, there is no response to the output gap, ½y = 0.
The historical rule entails a welfare cost of 0:08 per cent of the lifetime consumption associated with
the optimized CPI in°ation-targeting rule (see second row in Table 3). Most of the welfare improvement
of choosing ½¼ = 1:20 and ½y = 0 rather than the estimated parameters comes from the ¯rst-level e®ect or
improvement in long-run average utility, which amounts to a 0:11 per cent increase in lifetime consumption.
This welfare-maximizing monetary policy reaction function implies slightly higher volatility in the utility
arguments (see second row of Table 4), which is captured by a negative second-order e®ect, as well as in
output, while it only very marginally stabilizes in°ation.
As Table 4 shows, not only consumption and the other arguments in the utility function show higher
volatility; so do output and the monetary policy instrument. Instead, in°ation remains with similar levels of
volatility. Table 5 shows the medians of the long-run variance decomposition of model variables under this
new monetary policy rule. It does not di®er much from that in Table 2. However, it is worth noting that
consumption variability is better explained by domestic shocks, including the monetary policy shock, and less
by foreign shocks than under the historical rule. In°ation variability owes much more to monetary policy
shocks than under the historical rule, but the explanatory power of foreign shocks has not substantially
decreased. In general, monetary policy shocks are more responsible for aggregate variability under this
10Several reasons motivate the choice of ¯xing ½R. One is that without interest rate smoothing, there would be indeterminacy
for values of the coe±cent on in°ation smaller than one. By keeping ½R at its estimated value, we can compute the welfare
gains of a wider range of values for ½¼, including those smaller than one.
Another important reason is that because the optimized rule would aim at maximizing in°ation stabilization rather than
instrument smoothing, the welfare-maximizing value of ½R is very likely going to be zero. Indeed, Schmitt-Groh¶ e and Uribe
(2004b) ¯nd that the optimal degree of interest rate smoothing for Taylor rules in the Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans
(2001) model is zero. However, they also look, as we do, for the parameterization of the Taylor rule that delivers higher utility
for degrees of interest rate smoothing closer to the observed ones. Keeping our frame of analysis of alternative monetary policy
reaction functions close to the observed features of monetary policy as it is implemented in practice constitutes a further reason
for keeping ½R ¯xed as well as for sticking to simple Taylor rules. A ¯nal reason is that maximizing welfare over several
parameters is computationally expensive.
17optimized strict in°ation-targeting rule than under the historical one.
In terms of the responses to shocks, the impulse responses obtained by replacing the historical rule with
this new optimized CPI in°ation-targeting rule are quite similar. The median responses are displayed in
Figures 6 to 8, together with those that would have been obtained in the case of °exible prices and wages11
and with an alternative monetary policy reaction function that will be explained later, i.e., targeting wage
in°ation.
What is the e®ect of this alternative monetary policy speci¯cation on the likelihood of in°ation being
out of target? The top two panels of Figure 9 show the time series of deviations of annualized in°ation
from target simulated out of the estimated model under the historical rule (top left panel) and under the
CPI in°ation stabilization rule (top right panel). The graphs show the median and 90 per cent bands of
simulating 500 times in°ation series of 200 observations each. Figure 9 reports the resulting series when all
estimated shocks are occurring, with their respective estimated standard deviations. This ¯gure reads as
follows. Under the historical rule and given the observed shocks in the past three decades, 90 per cent of the
times in°ation has been around target plus or minus 5 per cent, i.e., if the target is a 2 per cent in°ation
rate, it says it has been between 7 per cent and ¡3 per cent. Instead, had the monetary policy reaction
function been the CPI stabilization function suggested in this subsection, the annual in°ation rate would
have been between 0:04 under or above the target 90 per cent of the time, e.g., between 1:96 per cent and
2:04 per cent in°ation if the target is 2 per cent.
Figures 18 to 25 report the same simulated annual CPI in°ation series under di®erent monetary policy
reaction functions when only one of the eight estimated shocks occurs at one time. These ¯gures show that
the shocks that are found to be responsible for the deviations of CPI in°ation from target are, in order
of importance, the total-factor productivity shock in the non-traded-goods sector, the shock to the foreign
interest rate, the shock to the risk premium, the monetary policy shock, and the total-factor productivity
shock in the traded-goods sector. Of less importance are the shocks to foreign in°ation and output; the least
important is the shock to real money demand. The relative degree of importance of each shock is explained
by the combination of their estimated standard deviations (see Table 1) and their relevance in explaining
the variance of in°ation (see variance decomposition in Tables 2 and 5 to 7). In that sense, the shock to non-
traded total-factor productivity has both high estimated volatility and high explanatory power of aggregate
°uctuations, while the shock to real money demand has very high estimated volatility but almost no e®ect
on in°ation variability, as shown in the variance decomposition.
5.2 Targeting other in°ation rates: CPI versus wage in°ation
Our model has di®erent degrees of nominal inertia in the di®erent sectoral prices and in wages. A welfare-
maximizing central bank may prefer to target just one sectoral in°ation instead of aggregate CPI in°ation, or
it may prefer to target wage in°ation or combinations of speci¯c price in°ations, depending on the sensitivity
of households' utility to speci¯c price and wage developments.
In fact, several recent papers have found that the optimal monetary policy may entail such choices
11However, we keep the rest of the estimated parameters of Table 1, including those referring to the monetary policy reaction
function. Suppressing the latter would mean not being able to solve the model.
18in the context of sticky-price, dynamic stochastic general-equilibrium models with di®erent sectors. Aoki
(2001) shows that in a closed economy with a °exible-price sector and a sticky-price sector, the optimal
monetary policy is to target sticky-price in°ation only. In a closed economy but where labour and product
markets exhibit staggered prices, Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000) ¯nd that strict price-in°ation targeting
generates relatively large welfare losses with respect to the optimal °exible-price, °exible-wage monetary
policy, while combinations of wage- and price-in°ation targeting or of price-in°ation and output-gap targeting
or even strict output-gap targeting perform nearly as well as the optimal one. In a similar economy but with
two sectors, durables and non-durables, Erceg and Levin (2002) ¯nd it near-optimal to target a weighted
average of aggregate price and wage in°ation. Similarly, Huang and Liu (2004) ¯nd near-optimal an interest
rate rule that targets a combination of CPI and producer price index (PPI) in°ation when there are nominal
rigidities in markets for both ¯nished goods and intermediate goods.
In an open economy setting, Benigno (2004) shows in a model with di®erent regions rather than sectors,
that the monetary policy is near-optimal when the region with the higher nominal rigidity receives the higher
weight in the in°ation-targeting strategy. Finally, Smets and Wouters (2002) estimate di®erent degrees of
domestic and import price stickiness and ¯nd the optimal monetary policy minimizing a weighted average
of both domestic and import-price in°ations.
We have applied our welfare criterion speci¯ed above to optimize over the parameters of varieties of
the Taylor rule. First, we have considered aggregate CPI in°ation, ¼, wage in°ation, ¼W, and output-gap
targeting, as in
log(Rt=R) = %R log(Rt¡1=R) + %¼ log(¼t=¼) + %¼W log(¼W
t =¼W) + %y log(yt=y): (53)
Figure 10 represents the welfare surfaces with respect to ½¼ and ½¼W for di®erent values of ½y, while hold-
ing constant the estimated degree of policy inertia, ½R = 0:46. As explained above, the welfare measure corre-
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The welfare surfaces appear to be piecewise smooth in ½¼, ½¼W, and ½y, except when approaching the zero-
in°ation-targeting area, where the decline in welfare is abrupt.12 Figure 10 shows clearly that reacting
aggressively to the output gap can be very damaging in terms of welfare losses. This is especially the case
when the reaction to in°ation deviations from target is low and where the welfare cost of the suboptimal
rule is increasing in ½y.
The welfare-maximizing parameterization is the one explained above: strict CPI in°ation targeting with
coe±cient ½¼ = 1:2 (½¼W = 0 and ½y = 0). It is interesting to note that moving to a higher ½¼ coe±cient or
to strict wage-in°ation targeting with ½¼W > 1 practically does not diminish welfare.
In the same spirit as Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000), rows 4, 5, and 6 of Tables 3 and 4 demonstrate
the welfare and macroeconomic volatility implications of completely stabilizing one argument at a time in
12Due to the possible °atness of the welfare function in some areas of the parameter space, we search for the welfare-maximizing
interest rate rule using a grid-search method over the policy parameters rather than relying on local optimizing routines. The
intervals of the grid search on the coe±cients are of size 0.2. The values for which there is indeterminacy, typically ½¼ = 0 and
½¼W = 0, are not plotted.
Moreover, we restrict the search to values within the [0;5] interval, and with the [0;4] interval, when we search the coe±cients
for several sectoral in°ations at the same time.
19the above interest rate reaction function.13 We ¯nd that strict output-gap stabilization reduces welfare with
respect to the historical rule. Aggressive, strict CPI in°ation stabilization can improve welfare only very
marginally with respect to ½¼ = 1:2 (a welfare gain of 0.085 versus 0.08 in the optimized CPI in°ation
targeting rule), while it signi¯cantly increases consumption and output volatility.
Strict wage-in°ation stabilization substantially increases all volatilities except consumption and hence
cannot improve welfare with respect to CPI in°ation targeting. This result seems to contradict part of the
reported previous research, which found that targeting the in°ation rate of the stickier price would improve
welfare.
To further understand the relatively poor performance in terms of welfare in wage-in°ation targeting, we
have simulated the impulse responses of the main macro variables in our model using a strict CPI in°ation-
targeting rule, a strict wage-in°ation-targeting rule (with the same reaction to deviations of wage in°ation
from target as the optimized CPI in°ation-targeting rule, i.e., ½¼W = 1:2), and the responses under °exible
prices and wages. Figures 6 to 8 show the impulse-response functions to the most important shocks given
their contribution to explain the variability of the main macro variables, i.e., the non-traded technology
shock and domestic and foreign monetary policy shocks. The magnitudes and signs of the shocks are the
same as in section 4.
In the case of the main shock driving the dynamics of our model, the technology shock in the non-
traded-goods sector, Figure 6 shows how the di®erent impulse responses under optimized CPI in°ation
targeting are closer to the °exible-price scenario than the strict wage-in°ation-targeting monetary policy
rule. In particular, consumption increases to a far lesser degree under wage-in°ation targeting than under
CPI in°ation targeting or than under the °exible-price case, and therefore welfare improvement is smaller.
This is because of the di®erent reaction of the monetary policy. Under wage in°ation, interest rises after
the increase in wages owing to the increase in non-traded-goods production. Instead, the fall in non-traded-
goods and aggregate in°ation after the positive technology shock makes interest rates fall under CPI in°ation
targeting, enhancing the increase in consumption and welfare.
In the case of a depreciation induced by an unexpected increase in U.S. interest rates, Figure 7 shows again
how wage-in°ation targeting yields responses that lie farther apart from those of the °exible-price scenario
than in the case of targeting CPI in°ation. Under wage-in°ation targeting, interest rates do not rise after
increased imports in°ation. Because the import sector does not use labour in this model, the fall in imports
due to the depreciation does not lower labour demand and hence does not lower wages, so the monetary
policy does not react to the shock and as a result consumption falls far less than in the °exible-prices case.
Figure 8 shows the responses to a rise in domestic interest rates. In the case of °exible prices, the fall
in activity translates into an immediate drop in all prices and hence an immediate o®setting fall of interest
rates (due to the Taylor rule reacting to deviations from CPI in°ation from target, as well as to the output
gap) so that interest rates and all real variables and relative prices remain almost unchanged, consumption
and utility included. With sticky prices and wages, monetary policy shocks obviously have an e®ect on real
13An exceptional case is when we compare our welfare results with the case of the historical estimated rule rather than with
the °exible-price optimal rule. To guarantee complete stabilization of the target variable, we impose very high coe±cents one at
a time: ½¼ = 100, ½¼W = 100; and ½y = 2. The latter is not that high, because higher values for ½y would cause indeterminacy
unless they are coupled with high-in°ation-reaction coe±cients, which, by de¯nition, is impossible in this exercise.
20variables. However, this e®ect is more intense in the case of wage-in°ation targeting, which again helps to
explain the poor welfare performance of such a rule in this model relative to CPI in°ation targeting. The
reason for that is that all prices fall after the contractionary shock, but since wages are the stickiest of all
prices, they fall by less and therefore the immediate o®setting drop in interest rates is smaller. This leads to
a deeper fall in consumption and hence in utility and welfare than in the case of CPI in°ation targeting.
We can conclude from these impulse responses that CPI in°ation targeting, and not wage-in°ation
targeting, achieves similar responses to the °exible-prices case in crucial variables, especially consumption,
which is the variable driving utility and hence welfare.
In terms of other business cycle properties under wage-in°ation targeting, Table 6 shows that the variance
decomposition in this case di®ers from that of the historical monetary policy rule or the optimized strict
CPI in°ation-targeting rule mainly in the substantially higher impact of domestic monetary policy shocks
on all variables. The rest is similar.
In terms of the likelihood of aggregate in°ation deviations from target, the lower right plot in Figures 9
and 18 to 25 shows the simulated CPI in°ation series under wage-in°ation targeting (again, with ½¼W = 1:2).
Obviously, in the case of monetary policy focusing on dampening wage-in°ation deviations from target and
not on CPI in°ation deviations, the latter is found more likely than under wage-in°ation targeting.
5.3 Targeting other in°ation rates: Sectoral in°ation rates
We now explore the case where the monetary authority can react di®erently to the di®erent sectoral in°ation
rates: imports, traded goods, and non-traded goods in an interest rule of the type
log(Rt=R) = %R log(Rt¡1=R) + %¼m log(¼m
t =¼m)
+%¼N log(¼N
t =¼N) + %¼Td log(¼Td
t =¼Td): (54)
We compare the welfare gain and the volatility implications for di®erent combinations of the monetary
authority reactions to ¼m
t , ¼N
t , and ¼Td
t . Again, policy inertia is set to the estimated value, and we set ½y = 0;
corresponding to the optimized value with the CPI in°ation Taylor rule. We do so to diminish considerably
the time of optimizing the monetary rule over various coe±cients for the di®erent in°ation rates.
Figures 11 and 12 show a very clear result in two di®erent ways: aiming to stabilize to a greater degree
the in°ation rate in the imports sector or in the domestically produced traded-goods sector does not increase
welfare in any noticeable way. Only non-traded-goods in°ation targeting does. Row 7 in Tables 3 and 4
shows the results for a coe±cient on ¼N
t of 4, which is higher in Figures 11 and 12. The welfare gain of
such a rule is far superior to the others explored thus far, and that is so because of the higher long-run
average consumption and real money balances, despite the much higher macroeconomic instability it causes.
In fact, aggregate in°ation and output volatilities are both more than ¯ve times those of the optimized CPI
in°ation-targeting rule. Pushing to the limit non-traded in°ation stabilization (row 8 in Tables 3 and 4)
doubles the welfare gain but at the cost of macroeconomic volatility that is twice as great.
Consequently, the central bank should react more aggressively to non-traded-goods in°ation and not
at all to the other sectors. This is consistent with previous ¯ndings in the literature whereby the optimal
21monetary policy is to target exclusively the in°ation rate of the sector that has more nominal inertia, which
in our case is the non-traded-goods sector.
Table 7 shows the variance decomposition when the monetary policy reacts only to deviations of non-
traded-goods in°ation from target, with a coe±cient %¼N = 4. Virtually no other shock other than a
technology shock to non-traded goods explains the variability of all aggregate variables.
That shock has substantially higher estimated volatility than any other shock (except for the shock to
money demand, which explains virtually nothing of the variability of model variables in all cases). This
explains the high volatility observed in all variables in Table 4, as well as the higher likelihood of CPI
in°ation to diverge from target (bottom left plot in Figures 9 and 18 to 25).
This disconnect of the economy from shocks other than those to the non-traded-goods sector may also
be behind the need of big movements of the monetary policy instrument to bring non-traded-goods in°ation
back to target. This would explain the high %¼N parameter value required to increase welfare as well as
the high volatility of the nominal interest rate reported in Table 4. The high volatility of the interest rates
translates into high volatility in real money balances, as can be seen in Table 4 as well. More important,
however, it can include episodes of zero nominal interest rates.14
6 E®ect of Size of Non-Traded Sector on In°ation Targeting
As we reported earlier, the idea behind targeting in°ation in the non-traded-goods sector is motivated by the
importance of this sector in the economy we estimate for Canada. In this section, we do some counterfacual
exercises|¯rst, to understand to which extent the non-traded-goods sector exhibits the most distortionary
market, and second, to relate our ¯ndings to previous studies, particularly the one by Erceg, Henderson, and
Levin (2000).
To understand to what extent the non-traded-goods sector is the most important one for the monetary
authority when establishing policy, we set di®erent values for the weight of non-traded goods in the con-
sumption basket, n, keeping the rest of the parameters unchanged. Figure 13 reports cases under n = 0:00,
0:20, 0:40, and 0:60, where we report the utility level as a function of the degree of reaction of the monetary
authority to the price- versus wage-in°ation gap. Note that for the one-sector model, where only tradable
goods can be consumed domestically, we retrieve the result found by Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000).
Particularly, when wages and prices are sticky, monetary policy cannot achieve the Pareto-optimal welfare
level, and with the same duration for wage and price contracts, the monetary policy rule should focus more
on stabilizing the wage-in°ation °uctuations. We show clearly that this result remains the same when we
consider an open economy model with one production sector; consequently, the exchange rate e®ect doesn't
have a big impact on the optimal rule. This is clearly illustrated in the two top panels and the lower left-hand
panel in Figure 13. Nevertheless, we notice that the gap between the performance of stabilizing either price
or wage in°ation tends to decrease when the share of non-traded goods increases. Moreover, the gap vanishes
at a value of n between 0:40 and 0:60, and the result is then reversed as the lower right-hand panel shows:
a rule of price-in°ation targeting performs better than one that targets wage in°ation.
14We thank Pierre Duguay for this observation.
22We also notice that CPI in°ation stabilization can become welfare improving for higher values of n; even
if the optimal rule is to target only in°ation in the non-traded-goods sector; this is obviously explained by
the high relative share of the non-traded goods in the ¯nal consumption basket of households.15
7 Price-Level Targeting
As stated in the introduction, many issues arise when a price-level target is introduced, such as the implica-
tions for the price level and responses of in°ation to shocks, as well as for the volatility of the main macro
variables, not the least of which is in°ation itself.
Starting with Wicksell (1907), many authors have considered aggregate price-level stability as the main
goal of central banks, and this is re°ected in the mandates of many central banks. How to achieve price
stability has more often been interpreted as targeting at an explicit in°ation rate or range than as targeting a
speci¯c price-level path. Still, some recent research has shown that there can be substantial gains in including
a speci¯c price-level target in the monetary policy reaction function. In Bank of Canada (1998), Coulombe
(1998) shows that there is a clear information gain under an explicit price-level-targeting regime: the price
level itself conveys in that case useful information about future in°ation, because past shocks to prices must
be reversed in the future. Under strict in°ation targeting, however, where all shocks to the price level are
permanent, the price level reveals no useful information. In Bank of Canada (1998), Black, Macklem, and
Rose (1998) show that, when comparing simple monetary policy rules in a calibrated small open economy
one-good model of the Canadian economy, and provided the price-level target is credible and that private
sector expectations of in°ation adjust accordingly, the economy performs better with a price-level target
than with an in°ation target, in the sense that the variability of both in°ation and output are lower with the
price-level target. These potential bene¯ts of price-level targeting are not without risks, however. How to
communicate such policy is a challenge. It could be di±cult to justify why, following an increase in in°ation
above its long-run average, in°ation had to be reduced below this long-run average for some time to drive
the price level back to its target. Also, that reduction in in°ation after the monetary policy takes action can
lead to sharper initial declines in economic activity than under a strict in°ation-targeting regime.
Giannoni (2000) argues that simple price-level-targeting rules,16 while as simple as standard in°ation-
targeting Taylor rules, have received considerably less attention in recent studies of monetary policy. It is
widely believed that such rules would result in greater variability of in°ation (and, under nominal rigidity, of
the output gap), since the policy-maker would respond to an in°ationary shock by generating a de°ation in
subsequent periods. Studies such as Lebow, Roberts, and Stockton (1992) and Haldane and Salmon (1995)
support this conventional view. However, Giannoni (2000) shows that when agents are forward looking
15We undertake the same exercise with elasticity of substitution between non-traded goods and the tradable goods sold
domestically, Á, and the conclusions are the same. Particularly, with a higher degree of substitution, the non-traded-goods
sector is less important in the model; consequently, the monetary authority should stabilize wage in°ation rather than price
in°ation.
16In those rules, the nominal interest rate deviates from a constant in response to the output gap and to deviations of the
price level from a prespeci¯ed path of constant in°ation. Giannoni (2000) follows Woodford (1998, 2003) in referring to such
rules as \Wicksellian." Wicksell (1907) argued that \price stability" could be obtained by allowing the interest rate to respond
positively to °uctuations in the price level.
23and the monetary authority credibly commits to a price-level-targeting rule, such a Wicksellian rule yields
lower variability of in°ation and of nominal interest rates. Agents' expectation of a future de°ation after an
in°ationary shock dampens the initial increase in in°ation, lowers the variability of in°ation, and increases
welfare. Williams (1999) con¯rms this result using the FRB/US model.
More recently, and closer to our approach, Batini and Yates (2003) also challenge the established view
that price-level targeting entails lower price-level variance at the expense of higher in°ation and output
variance. They investigate monetary policy regimes that combine price-level and in°ation targeting in a
variety of models and conclude that the relative merits of each regime depend on several modelling and
policy assumptions, and do so in a non-monotonic fashion when moving from one regime to another.
In this section, we conduct the same calculations of welfare gains and implied macroeconomic volatility
as before, but we consider a di®erent type of monetary policy reaction function, i.e., where the central bank
is concerned with returning the price level to its target path as well as or instead of bringing the in°ation
rate to target.17
We follow Batini and Yates (2003) and encompass price-level and in°ation targeting using the following
speci¯cation of the monetary policy reaction function:
log(Rt=R) = ½R log(Rt¡1=R) + ½P[log(Pt= ¹ Pt) ¡ ´P log(Pt¡1= ¹ Pt¡1)] + ½y log(yt=y); (55)
where ¹ Pt is the target or steady-state value for the price level at period t; compatible with the established
in°ation target. Note that for ´P = 1, we have the exact case of the Taylor rule de¯ned for the in°ation
rate, while ´P = 0 means pure price-level targeting. For 0 < ´P < 1; the rule is a hybrid one where the
central bank is concerned about reaching the in°ation target rate but also about the evolution of prices on
the way to the in°ation target. As before, we keep ½R = 0:46 and ½y = 0 ¯xed while jointly optimizing over
0 · ´P · 1 and over ½P.
Figure 14 shows the utility surface of this optimization exercise, while further welfare implications and
the implied volatility are shown in row 9 of Tables 3 and 4. Two results emerge from this exercise. First,
it is almost impossible to establish a clear ranking of combinations of parameters in this case; the long-run
utility level associated with the depicted parameter surface is virtually the same. Pure approximation errors
embedded in our procedure could be behind the plotted di®erences. Second, for the central bank to give
a non-zero weight to the deviations of the price level from its target path, i.e., for ´P < 1, the monetary
policy reaction to price and in°ation deviations from target has to be very low, ½P = 0:2: In that case,
welfare is maximized for the hybrid rule with ´P = 0:25, i.e., where 25 per cent of the price-stability concern
of the monetary authority takes the form of in°ation targeting and the rest is pure price-level targeting.
Still, the welfare gain is almost unnoticeable and comes from the lower volatility induced (smaller negative
second-level e®ect) by the mild reaction of the monetary policy.
It is interesting that gains from an explicit price-level target come only with low policy reactions, causing
a far longer time to bring about price and in°ation stabilization than in strict in°ation-targeting regimes.
17We have computed the simulated impulse responses of the main macro variables after all shocks in the economy and ¯nd
very similar reactions under pure in°ation targeting as under pure price-level targeting for the same degree of price stabilization
(same ½P coe±cient).
24This result is in line with the ¯ndings of Smets (2003).
We have explored the issue of whether wages or a particular sectoral price is a better target for the
monetary policy than aggregate CPI in the context of strict price-level targeting, that is, with ½y = 0 and
´P = 0. Figure 15 shows that, consistent with the ¯ndings in the case of pure in°ation targeting, welfare
improves only and substantially if the monetary authority targets only the price on the non-traded-goods
sector. Row 10 in Tables 3 and 4 shows that the gain doesn't reach the level of the pure non-traded-goods
in°ation stabilization, but it does cause higher in°ation and output volatility.
Finally, we jointly optimize again over 0 · ´P · 1 and over ½P for the case where only the price level
and in°ation of the non-traded-goods sector are taken into account. Figure 16 shows the results. For low
levels of monetary policy response to deviations from price stability, there is virtually no welfare di®erence
between price-level and in°ation targeting, but as the central bank becomes more concerned with price
stability (higher ½P N), there is a clear welfare gain in moving towards strict in°ation targeting (´P N = 1) in
this sector-speci¯c scenario.
8 Targeting Future Price Developments
To conclude these optimization exercises for simple monetary policy rules, we explore the impact of targeting
expected future deviations of the in°ation rate or the price level rather than targeting contemporaneous
deviations. In their analysis of price-level versus in°ation targeting under di®erent model speci¯cations,
policy rules, and loss functions of the central bank, Batini and Yates (2003) ¯nd that the more forward
looking the model, the less noticeable the di®erence between the reaction functions of in°ation and price-
level targeting.
The top panel of Figure 17 shows the welfare surfaces for the cases in which we optimize over the
coe±cients for CPI and wage-in°ation stabilization for di®erent values of the coe±cient for output-gap
stabilization. In this case, all deviations from target to which the monetary policy reacts are one-period-
ahead expected future deviations, that is, in the next quarter.
The two main results are: (i) the welfare-maximizing parameter set is exactly the same as when the
central bank is not forward looking, i.e., ½+1
¼ = 1:2; ½
+1
¼W = 0, and ½+1
y = 0, and (ii) the welfare attained
with a forward-looking monetary policy rule is noticeably higher. Row 3 of Table 3 shows that the welfare
gain is now 0.11 per cent of the lifetime consumption versus 0.08 per cent when optimizing a contemporary
monetary policy rule. And this welfare gain comes with increased output and in°ation volatility but with
lower volatility in households' utility (see row 3 in Table 4).
The bottom panel of Figure 17 shows the welfare surface for the case when the monetary authority follows
a forward-looking, one-period-ahead strict price-level-targeting rule and optimizes over its reaction to the
next quarter's expected deviation of the CPI price level, ½
+1
P , and the wage level, ½
+1
W : Again, the values





W = 0, but the welfare attained is higher than in the non-forward-looking case. Still, the welfare gain
is smaller than in the forward-looking strict in°ation-targeting rule.
25Of all the possible speci¯cations explored in this paper, the one that achieves a higher welfare given the
estimated model for the Canadian economy without causing substantial excess macroeconomic volatility is
a strict in°ation-targeting rule where the central bank reacts to the next period's expected deviation from
the in°ation target, and does not target the output gap but allows for a moderate degree of nominal interest
rate smoothing.
9 Conclusion
We analyze welfare-improving monetary policy reaction functions in the context of a New Keynesian small
open economy model with a traded-goods and a non-traded-goods sector and with sticky prices and wages.
The model is estimated for the case of Canada and is used to evaluate the welfare gains of alternative
speci¯cations of the feedback nominal interest rate rule.
The model is estimated using Bayesian techniques for quarterly Canadian data. We ¯nd statistically
signi¯cant heterogeneity in the degree of price rigidity across sectors. We explore what would have been
the optimal parameterization of a Taylor rule such as the estimated one, where the central bank targets
aggregate in°ation. We ¯nd welfare gains in responding slightly more aggressively to aggregate in°ation
deviations from target than has been the case in the past three decades, and of not responding to the
output gap, as opposed to what the Bank of Canada has done. We ¯nd further welfare gains in targeting
sectoral rather than aggregate in°ation. In particular, the gains are highest if the monetary authority reacts
more aggressively to non-traded-goods in°ation, since prices are stickier in that production sector. But the
implications in terms of business cycle °uctuations of such a policy rule are discouraging|high volatility is
induced in the system, including a high probability of large deviations of CPI in°ation from target.
We then consider recent literature that has questioned the optimality of aiming at a stable in°ation rate
instead of a stable price level in a world where households would prefer to reduce uncertainty about the
long-run purchasing value of money. We look for the welfare-maximizing speci¯cation of an interest rate
reaction function that targets a combination of price-level and in°ation targets or just one of the two, the
price levels being the aggregate CPI, wages, and sectoral prices. We ¯nd no clear welfare gain in moving
towards price-level targeting, unless the monetary authority is willing to accept very long horizons for prices
and in°ation to return to target.
We ¯nd that the higher welfare without inducing excess macroeconomic volatility is achieved with a strict
in°ation-targeting rule where the central bank reacts to next period's expected deviation from the in°ation
target. Moreover, the central bank should not target the output gap but should allow for a moderate degree
of nominal interest rate smoothing.
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29Table 1: Parameter Estimation Results
Parameter distribution
Prior Posterior
Parameter Type Mean Std. error Median 90 per cent interval
½AN Beta 0:85 0:1 0:7976 [0:7419 ; 0:8404]
½AT Beta 0:85 0:1 0:5850 [0:5018 ; 0:6746]
½b Beta 0:85 0:1 0:8128 [0:7359 ; 0:8712]
½R¤ Beta 0:8 0:1 0:7175 [0:6672 ; 0:7913]
½y¤ Beta 0:85 0:1 0:7486 [0:6419 ; 0:8470]
½¼¤ Beta 0:8 0:1 0:5330 [0:4515 ; 0:6044]
½· Beta 0:8 0:1 0:6289 [0:5698 ; 0:6727]
¾AN Inv. gamma 1:5 2 6:1442 [5:8442 ; 6:5318]
¾AT Inv. gamma 1:5 2 1:5003 [1:3487 ; 1:6095]
¾R Inv. gamma 1:5 2 0:9983 [0:9187 ; 1:1228]
¾b Inv. gamma 1:5 2 12:3049 [12:1777 ; 12:4786]
¾R¤ Inv. gamma 1:5 2 0:8421 [0:7618 ; 0:9330]
¾y¤ Inv. gamma 1:5 2 1:1208 [1:0466 ; 1:2398]
¾¼¤ Inv. gamma 1:5 2 0:4429 [0:4017 ; 0:5006]
¾· Inv. gamma 1:5 2 0:9846 [0:8981 ; 1:1067]
dM Beta 0:67 0:05 0:5101 [0:4453 ; 0:5585]
dN Beta 0:67 0:05 0:6243 [0:5790 ; 0:6604]
dT Beta 0:67 0:05 0:5951 [0:5622 ; 0:6296]
dh Beta 0:67 0:05 0:8027 [0:7519 ; 0:8453]
m Beta 0:6 0:05 0:5447 [0:5130 ; 0:5845]
n Beta 0:5 0:05 0:5355 [0:4825 ; 0:5967]
¹ Gamma 1:2 0:2 1:2496 [1:1320 ; 1:3439]
º Gamma 1:2 0:2 0:7140 [0:5915 ; 0:8440]
Á Gamma 1:2 0:2 2:2653 [2:1644 ; 2:3529]
' Normal ¡0:02 0:005 ¡0:0238 [¡0:0307 ; ¡0:0166]
Â Gamma 20 5 10:1331 [10:0299 ; 10:6912]
b Gamma 0:4 0:1 0:2715 [0:1643 ; 0:4142]
½R Beta 0:8 0:1 0:4612 [0:4077 ; 0:5082]
½¼ Gamma 1:5 0:2 1:1888 [1:0624 ; 1:3432]
½y Normal 0:2 0:1 0:3142 [0:2570 ; 0:3937]
®N Beta 0:34 0:05 0:1982 [0:1570 ; 0:2453]













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































41Figure 6: Non-Tradable-Goods Technology Shock





































































42Figure 7: Foreign Nominal Interest Rate Shock






































































43Figure 8: Local Nominal Interest Rate Shock


































































44Figure 9: Simulated Time Series of CPI In°ation, All Shocks


































































































































































48Figure 13: Price-Level Targeting versus Wage-In°ation Targeting




































































































































































































































































































































































53Figure 18: Simulated In°ation, AN Shock Only


































54Figure 19: Simulated In°ation, AT Shock Only









































55Figure 20: Simulated In°ation, Monetary Policy Shock Only










































56Figure 21: Simulated In°ation, Money-Demand Shock Only







































57Figure 22: Simulated In°ation, U.S. Monetary Policy Shock Only

































58Figure 23: Simulated In°ation, U.S. Output Shock Only
















































59Figure 24: Simulated In°ation, U.S. In°ation Shock Only















































60Figure 25: Simulated In°ation, Risk Premium Shock Only
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